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ABSTRACT
The effect of a tax-financed increase in government expenditure on
a small open economy is analyzed. It is shown that with perfectly
flexible prices four cases are possible. One of them predicts that for
a debtor-country, current account surpluses and an exchange depreciation
occurs when the policy is put into effect. This case is also examined
under sluggish price adjustment.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Exchange Rate, Current Account, Mundell-Fleming
Model, Crowding-Out.

1. INTRODUCTION
The effects of expansionary fiscal policy under a regime of flex-
ible exchange rates has attracted a lot of attention recently. This
reawakening of interest in this issue is due primarily to record U.S.
fiscal deficits.
The Mundell-Fleming model, which is still the most popular open-
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economy macro-model, predicts that a fiscal expansion would raise the
interest rate, lead to capital inflows which would appreciate the
nominal exchange rate. With prices fixed this implies a real
appreciation, which crowds out net exports. In the new equilibrium,
output and the interest rate are at their old levels. Net exports have
declined by the amount that the government expenditure has increased.
These conclusions have been amended and extended by a number of
authors to include among other things a properly specified supply
side, rational expectations, wealth effects and the government budget
3
constraint
.
The U.S. evidence is also broadly consistent with the model,
although the U.S. is not a small country. Between 1981-1983, the U.S.
real interest rates were at historically record levels as were the
actual and full-employment deficits, the U.S. dollar appreciated
significantly and this was accompanied by massive current account
deficits (which pushed the U.S. into a net debtor position vis-a-vis
the rest of the world).
There was some unease generated by the predictions of the Mundell-
Fleming model before the U.S. experience rehabilitated it. Writing
about the model, with expected depreciation added in the uncovered
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interest parity condition, Dornbusch in his 1980 survey said, "The
model retains the uncomfortable property that any increase in demand
for home output ... leads to nominal and real appreciation," (Dornbusch
(1980) p. 154). He then introduced wealth effects but, alas, "the
uncomfortable fact remains that even in this model there is a short-run
tendency for an expenditure increase to induce an appreciation" (p.
157). He then adds that "expansionary fiscal policy will lead to an
initial depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate if ... (it)
is accommodated by an expansion in nominal money" (p. 157). His
discussant Branson agreed that a fiscal expansion should lead to a
depreciation (p. 188) but felt that imperfect asset substitutability
was required to generate such a result (p. 189).
Later papers, e.g., by Giavazzi and Sheen (1985), Sachs and Wyplosz
(1984) confirm Branson's conjecture on imperfect substitutability, and
Branson and Buiter (1983) generate the Mundell-Fleming results—an
appreciation and current account deficits—from a model where uncovered
interest parity holds.
In this paper we re-examine the whole issue of the long run and
impact effects of fiscal policy, especially on the current account and
the nominal and real exchange rates. We find that neither money-
finance of the deficit nor imperfect asset substitutability is required
for a nominal and real depreciation. In our model if the home country
is a net debtor to the rest of the world then this is the likely out-
come. In such a situation a current account surplus could also emerge.
In Section 2 we set out the model. Section 3 examines the long-»
run equilibrium.
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In Section 4, the dynamics of the model is analyzed under the
assumption of continuous full employment and flexible prices. Four
cases are possible and only one of them corresponds to the Mundell-
Fleming prediction of an instantaneous appreciation and a current
account deficit.
In Section 5 we focus on sticky prices. Rather than analyze the
four possible cases we look at one in detail. Here we find that on
impact a nominal (and real) depreciation is likely and a current
account surplus is quite possible.
Section 6 discusses the strong assumptions we made and the conclu-
sions.
2. THE MODEL
The model is an open economy version of our IS-LM-Phillips curve
model with a classical long run equilibrium. Agents have rational
expectations. Both the money and goods demand functions have wealth
as an argument, so there is also a wealth accumulation equation.
The economy produces a good which is an imperfect substitute for
the imported good which is produced abroad. It takes all foreign
variables as given. For simplicity it is assumed all bonds are denom-
inated in the foreign currency. We shall also ignore interest pay-
ments on these bonds so that no distinction is made between the trade
balance and the current account.
The model is given below. (All variables except interest rates
are in logarithms, a dot over a variable denotes a time derivative and
all coefficients are positive.)
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M - Q = -o,! + a
2
Y + W (1)
i = i* + E (2)
Y = B
1
(E-Q) + B
2
W + 6
3
G (3)
Q = n(Y-Y) + u (4)
Either W E fE + fF + (l-f)M - Q (5a)
or W = -fE - fD + (l-f)M - Q (5b)
Either F - Y(W-W) (6a)
or D = -y(W-W) (6b)
W = a Y - a
2
G + a
3
i*
,
(7)
where M is the nominal stock of money (assumed to be constant), E the
nominal exchange rate expressed as the domestic currency price of
foreign exchange, Q the price of the domestic good in domestic
currency, i the domestic nominal interest rate, i* the foreign nominal
(and real) interest rate, Y is the level of domestic output (Y) is its
fixed long-run level), W is real domestic wealth, F the domestic
holding of foreign assets, D the domestic debt (in foreign currency),
G the expenditure on domestic goods by the government, f the share of
the foreign asset (debt) in domestic wealth, and W the desired level of
wealth and jj the (fixed) rate of growth of money.
Equation (1) is the money market (or equivalently asset markets)
equilibrium condition. The real money supply (in terms of the domestic
good) must equal the demand for it. 4 The demand falls as the nominal
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interest rate rises, rises as output (the transactions proxy) rises and
is homogeneous of degree one in wealth (this is discussed in detail
below in Section 6).
Equation (2) links the domestic nominal interest rate to the
foreign interest rate via the uncovered interest parity condition,
i.e., the difference between the former and the latter is the expected
rate of depreciation of the domestic currency.
Equation (3) is the domestic goods market equilibrium condition.
Output Y is demand-determined in the short run. Demand for domestic
output depends on total expenditure and the terms of trade, given
government expenditure on domestic goods. Expenditure depends on
disposable income and saving. All government expenditure in this model
is on domestic goods and is financed by lump-sum taxes, so a rise in G
causes excess demand for domestic goods. A rise in wealth also
creates excess demand for domestic goods. A worsening of the terras of
trade (a rise in (E-Q), the foreign currency price of the foreign good
is constant) switches demand towards domestic goods—implicitly we are
assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied. Note
absorption does not, in our formulation, depend on the real interest
rate. Since the Mundell-Fleming results do not depend on the slope of
the IS curve, this assumption does not seem overly strong although it
is certainly unrealistic.
The Phillips curve is given in Equation (4). The expected rate of
inflation is given by y, the rate of growth of money which is expected
to remain constant (see e.g., Buiter and Miller (1984) for this and
other specif icafions; also see Mussa (1982), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984)
for a discussion of this issue). In what follows, without loss of
generality, we get p equal to zero.
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Real wealth is defined in Equation (5). For the net creditor
country Equation (5a) expresses it as a sum of real balances and real
value (in terms of the domestic good) of foreign currency bonds. For
the debtor country Equation (5b) subtracts foreign currency debt.
Note that adding domestic currency bonds would not make any substan-
tial difference in the model structure.
Equation (6) is the asset dynamic equation. Savings are assumed
to be proportional to the gap between the (logs of) desired and actual
wealth (see Metzler (1951), Tobin and Buiter (1976) and Dornbusch
(1975)). Since we are ignoring capital gains and losses as components
of disposable income (though not in the interest parity condition) and
the supply of the only other asset M is fixed, all saving takes the
form of either foreign asset accumulation (6a) or foreign debt reduc-
tion (6b) (see Eaton and Turnovsky (1983) for a discussion). Other
arguments in the saving function would complicate the dynamics signifi-
cantly without necessarily shedding additional light.
Finally, target wealth is assumed to depend on the long run dispo-
sable income (hence negatively on G) and the real interest rate in
Equation (7)
.
Before analyzing the dynamics of this model under various assump-
tions about price flexibility, let us first briefly look at the long
run equilibrium of the model and the effect of expansionary fiscal
policy.
3. THE LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM
The long run equilibrium which is a stationary state is obtained
• • • •
by setting E = Q = F (or D) = 0.
-7-
M - Q = -a i* + a Y + W (8)
Y = 3
1
(E-Q) + B
2
W + 3
3
G (9)
3
1
Y
"
3
2
G + a
3
i * = * (10)
Either W = fE + f? + (1-f )M - Q (11a)
or W = -fD - f E~ + (1-f )M - Q (lib)
(where an overbar denotes a long-run value).
Equations (8) to (11) determine the long run values of E, Q, W and
F or D. In fact, the system is recursive. Equation (8) determines
the value of nominal wealth, Q + W, (given M, i* and Y but independently
of G). Then (10) determines Q and (9) E. The value of F or D is
obtained by substituting the value of E in (8). The importance of
homogeneity of degree one of money demand with respect to wealth is
brought out by the fact that E + F or E + D is constant across steady
states
.
The effect of an increase in G (lump-sum tax-financed) is to lower
wealth (from (10)), which, given the constancy of E + F or E + D, is
achieved by raising Q. Higher is a„ higher must Q be since dQ/dG = a..
From (9) then we have dE/dG = (Q a +Q a -$ )/ & — 0. It is immediately
clear from (9) that a real appreciation is required to clear the goods
market but the real appreciation is consistent with either nominal
appreciation or depreciation. Intuitively, in order to lower wealth, Q
may rise so much that E would also rise although d(E~-Q) < 0.
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From (8) and (11) dF (or dD) = -dE, i.e., across steady states E
and F (or E and D) were on a negatively sloped line with a slope of
minus one.
4. THE FULL-EMPLOYMENT CASE
In this section we briefly look at the case of full wage-price
flexibility so that output is always at the full employment level. It
is useful to set this up as a reference case because the dynamics here
is of second-order and therefore it lends itself to diagrammatic anal-
ysis and is intuitively clear. It is also possible to compare our
results with others, e.g., Branson and Buiter (1983).
(a) The Creditor Country F > 0)
By substituting (2) and (5a) in (1) we obtain the first differen-
tial equation (setting all exogeneous variables other than G equal to
zero)
:
E = (l/a
1
)E + (1/a^F (12)
Using (5a) and (7), we can solve (3) for Q
= c
][
E + c
2
F + c
3
G,
where c. = (B
:
+8
2
f )/(8
x
+8
2
) , c
2
= B_f/(B +B
2
), and
C 3
= (6
2
a
2
+B
3
)/(B
1
+B
2
).
Substituting this value of together with (7) and (5a) into (6a)
we have the other differential equation
f = e e - e
2
F + e
3
G, (13)
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where Q
y
= yB^l-f )/(6
1
+6
2
) , e
£
= yB^/(B^B^ , and
9
3
= Y(B
3
-a
2
B
1
)/(B
1
+B
2
).
Equations (12) and (13) govern the dynamics of the economy. The
determinant of the coefficient matrix is negative (-(6 +9 )/a ) and
thus the two roots are real and of opposite sign. The long run equil-
ibrium is a saddle-point as shown in Figure 1.
On the horizontal axis we measure F and on the vertical axis, E.
The E = locus is downward-sloping with a slope of minus one. The
F = locus is upward-sloping and SS is the stable arm converging to A.
We make the usual (but arbitrary) assumption that the economy is always
on the saddle path (for permanent policies once they have been imple-
mented). This is achieved by jumps in the exchange rate.
Following an unanticipated permanent increase in G, the long run
equilibrium could either be to the northwest (point B) or the south-
east (point C) of the old one along the E = line. In order for the
economy to get to B from A the exchange rate immediately jumps to the
point X, which is on the stable arm of B, F being predetermined. Over
time, the economy runs a current account deficit and the exchange rate
continues to depreciate. In the other case, the exchange rate jump
appreciates and the economy runs current account surpluses along the
convergent path.
(b) The Debtor Country (D > 0)
Proceeding as in the previous case we can express the dynamics of
the system in terms of two differential equations in E and D.
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E = -(1/a^E - (1/a^D (14)
D = -^ E - i|, D + ^
3
G (15)
where \\> = yB^d+f )/( 8 +8-) and ip = 8 and \\> = 8 in equation (13).
Again, it can be easily verified that the determinant of the coef-
ficient matrix of (14) and (15) is negative so the long run equilib-
rium is a saddle-point. This is shown in Figure 2.
On the horizontal axis we measure D and along the vertical axis,
as before, E. The E = line is still negatively sloped with a slope
of minus unity (but now the vertical arrows point towards it). The
D = locus is also downward-sloping but flatter than the E = locus.
The saddlepath converging to H is upward-sloping, so as in Figure 1 a
current account surplus (a fall in D) is accompanied by an appreciating
exchange rate.
A fiscal expansion could take us either to J or K in Figure 2. In
both cases the exchange rate on impact overshoots its long-run equil-
ibrium value. The model predicts that the exchange rate of debtor
countries are more volatile than those of creditor countries, at least
for non-monetary shocks.
If the new long-run equilibrium is at J then the exchange rate
depreciates when the policy is put into effect and current account
surpluses occur in the adjustment process. If, on the other hand, the
new long run equilibrium is at K, then we have the Mundell-Fleraing
case—on impact a jump appreciation of E and a current account deficit.
Of the four cases considered in Figures 1 and 2, only one, then,
gives the same prediction as the Mundell-Fleraing model. In Branson and
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Buiter (1983), a creditor country had an appreciation and a current
account deficit on impact. This was due to the fact that they assumed
money demand to be independent of wealth which tied down the long-run
price level. Then a fall in wealth requires a fall in E + F which in
their model leads to a fall in F.
It is important to remember that the version of our model we have
analyzed in this section is not the setting of the Mundell-Fleming
model. In particular, the issue of employment, variable output and
"crowding out" needs to be addressed. It is to these that we now turn.
5. THE MODEL WITH STICKY PRICES
In the sticky price case also there are four cases to be analyzed
corresponding to the four long-run equilibria that we encountered in
Figures 1 and 2. Rather than catalogue all the possibilities, let us
for concreteness focus on the case corresponding to point J in Figure
2. This case, as we shall see below is capable of generating predic-
tions, under plausible parameter values, about the nominal exchange
rate (and also the real exchange rate (E-Q)) and the current account in
the short-run which are exactly the opposite of the Mundell-Fleming
model—i.e., on impact we observe a nominal and real depreciation and
a current account surplus.
To derive the first of the three differential equations that
express the dynamics of the model with predetermined prices, substi-
tute (2), (3), (5b) and (7) in (1) to obtain (setting all exogenous
variables other than G equal to zero).
E = 6n E + 6 12Q + 6 13D + n lG
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6
11 7 °' 6 12 < °» 6 13 < °' n l > °
where the values of the 6's and n ' s are given in the Appendix.
To obtain the second differential equation substitute (3), (5b)
and (7) in (4)
Q = 6 21 E
+ 6
22
Q + 6
23
D + n
2
G
6
21 °»
6
22
< °' 6 23
< °* n 2
> °
We assume that effect of a rise in E increases demand for the
domestic output. Such an increase in E causes substitution in demand
which tends to raise output but it also lowers domestic wealth by
raising the domestic currency value of (the given) foreign debt. If
the former effect dominates then 6 > 0.
The final differential equation is (6b) with (7) and (5b) substi-
tuted in
D -« E + « Q +6
33
D + n
3
G
6
31
K °' 5 32
< °» 6 33
< °' n 3
> °
In matrix form we can write these three differential equations as
E E
Q = A
D D
+ nG (16)
The determinant of A = tt B .y f /a > 0, which implies that either
there are three unstable roots or one unstable and two stable roots.
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The trace of the coefficient matrix A is
= (-f+a
2
(B
1
-8
2
f)-ira
1
(B
1
+8
2
)-Ya
1
f)/a
1
A strong sufficient condition for this to be negative and thereby
rule out the complete instability case is that (-f+a«( 8 ~
8
?
f ) ) be
negative. This says the direct effect of an exchange depreciation on
the expected rate of depreciation be negative taking into account the
direct effect (-f/a..) and the indirect effect through the transactions
demand for money (ct
2 ( 8,-8^ )/«,) • That this is a strong sufficient
condition is clear from the fact that the other two terms of the trace
are negative.
If this condition is met then there is one positive root ("asso-
ciated with" the forward-looking variable E) and two negative roots
(or complex roots with negative real parts—"associated with" the pre-
determined variables Q and F).
But note that we cannot rule out the case of complete instability
in spite of the fact that we are ignoring the interest service account
which gives rise to such instabilities. The sum of the product of
two roots at a time = (f tt( 8 +89 ) + 8, yf ( tcl -cl) )/ct does not help in
ruling out the complete instability case.
Restricting our attention to the case where there are two stable
roots (possibly— if simulation models such as Buiter and Miller (1983)
are any guide almost inevitably—complex conjugates with negative real
parts), we turn to the analysis of the impact effect of an increase
in G. We follow a method outlined by Dixit (1980) (see Buiter (1984)
for a discussion of the general case and Buiter and Miller (1983) and
Neary and Purvis (1983) for applications).
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Dixit showed that for a permanent, unanticipated, immediately
implemented change and when the forcing variables are expected to
remain constant at their new values the relationship between a jump
variable (E in our case) and predetermined variables (Q and F) can be
represented by
E(t) - E = x(Q(t)-Q) + y(D(t)-D) (17)
where (-1, x, y) is the row eigen-vector associated with the unstable
root X . Equation (17) is the equation of the stable manifold,
u
At the moment of the implementation of the policy (at time 0), the
jump in the exchange rate is given by
dE(0+ )/dG = d!7dG - x.dQ/dG - y.dE)/dG (18)
Now for the case under consideration dE/dG > 0, dQ/dG > and
dD/dG < 0. As shown in the Appendix, y > and x is likely to be
negative. An extremely strong sufficient condition for the latter is
that a 8 > 1, i.e., the product of the output elasticity of money
demand and the terms of trade elasticity of output exceed unity. It
is interesting to note that this was a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for undershooting to occur following an increase in money supply
in Dornbusch's seminal contribution (Dornbusch (1976)) when output was
demand-determined (the case analyzed in the Appendix of that paper).
Here it is a sufficient condition for x to be negative, which in turn
is a sufficient condition for the exchange rate to overshoot its
long-run value following an increase in G (this is also true for a step
change in the money supply).
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The impact effect on the current account is ambiguous. If the
exchange rate depreciates on impact that lowers the wealth of a debtor
country. But an increase in government spending lowers the target
level of wealth since it is assumed that it is tax-financed and there-
fore the net effect on the current account is uncertain (a surplus
occurs if dE(0 ) > dQ) . It should be mentioned, however, that in the
new long-run equilibrium the stock of foreign debt is lower, so at some
point along the adjustment path the economy has to run current account
surpluses.
The effect on output is definitely expansionary in the short run
if, as is plausible, wealth effects are weak. An increased demand for
domestic goods is reinforced by a real depreciation. Even if the
current account moves into surplus output and inflation would certainly
rise
.
We thus find that contrary to the Mundell-Fleming model, the
short run response of the economy to a tax-financed fiscal expansion
is likely to be a short-run depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
(which is in excess of the long run depreciation) and possibly a
current account surplus, although this depends on parameter values.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Our model's dynamics is very complicated and in deriving our
results we have made heroic assumptions. Let us look at the
plausibility of some of these assumptions.
First, the long run comparative statics depends crucially on the
fact the nominal wealth is fixed across steady states. This requires
-16-
that wealth be an argument in the money demand function and the wealth
elasticity of money demand be unity.
There is substantial theoretical and empirical justification for
including wealth in the money demand function. For the theoretical
justification see Branson and Henderson (1985) where they derive a
money demand function from an individual's optimizing behavior.
Empirically wealth effects have helped in explaining the twin-mysteries
of "missing money" (see Goldfeld (1976)) and "multiplying marks" (see
Frankel (1982)).
Whether wealth enters the money demand equation with an elasticity
of one is, of course, an empirical question. Frankel (1982) found the
value to be between .95 and 1.79 for Germany and between .06 and .47
for the U.S. In any case, unit elasticity is also assumed in other
studies (e.g., Driskill and McCafferty (1985)) and serves as a useful
benchmark.
Second, the absence of a real interest rate term in the IS-curve
,
an expectations term in the Phillips curve and a deflector for nominal
magnitudes, which includes the exchange rate, do not change the re-
sults in any fundamental way. Note, since we have analyzed only unan-
ticipated, immediately implemented, permanent changes the criticism of
Mussa (1982) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1985) against anticipated future
shocks does not apply since our steady state is a noninf lationary one.
Third, the target saving function is a crucial simplification. A
more general specification, as in Driskill and McCafferty (1985) (which
they mistakenly refer to as Laursen-Metzler effect), could result in
some changes in our conclusions, though they would not in all probabil-
ity overturn them.
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Fourth, we have ignored the interest-service account and the non-
neutralities associated with thera (see Sachs and Wyplosz (1984) and
Giavazzi and Sheen (1984)). In these models—these are non-monetary
models—typically it is that the short-run and long-run effects on the
real exchange rate are opposite. A real depreciation leads to a cur-
rent account surplus which in turn leads to higher net claims on the
rest of the world and a higher interest income. To maintain current
account balance in the new steady state the trade balance must worsen,
which is achieved by a real appreciation. In the previous section we
saw that this is likely to be the case in our sticky-price model even
though there is no interest service account. In the flexible price
models in Section 4, however, this was unlikely.
Finally, imperfect subs titutability between domestic and foreign
assets also does not overturn the results. If the asset market condi-
tions were given by
M - Q = -m i + m Y + W
-E-D-Q = -ni + n E + W
we get a semi-reduced form expression for E as in equation (16).
Although the structure of the roots gets modified, it still is possible
to generate the results that we obtained earlier.
In this paper we have re-examined the effects of an expansionary
tax-financial fiscal policy directed towards the domestic good. For
the flexible-price case we found that four cases were possible—one of
which was the familiar Mundell-Fleraing result—on impact an appreciation
-18-
of the currency and a current account deficit. This case is possible
only for a debtor country, given pur model.
When prices are predetermined again four cases are possible. We
focussed on one where in the short-run there is a nominal (and hence
real) depreciation and the possibility of a currency account surplus
—
quite the opposite of the Mundell-Fleming result.
-19-
FOOTNOTES
See, for instance, Branson and Buiter (1983), Sachs and Wyplosz
(1984), Giavazzi and Sheen (1984). Dornbusch (1984) and Blanchard and
Dornbusch (1984) discuss the U.S. experience. Currie (1985) contains
an excellent discussion of the main problems of implementation of
policies in more general "ad-hoc" models. See also Branson, Fraga, and
Johnson (1985). Penati (1983) contains additional references.
There is by now a growing literature on fiscal policy in optimizing
models. See, e.g., Obstfeld (1981) for a discussion of the Uzawa-type
variable rate of time preference, Dornbusch (1983) for an outline of
temporary fiscal policy in a fixed discount rate set-up, and Frenkel
and Razin (1985) for a model with Yaari-type consumers with finite
lives
.
2
Throughout this paper we examine the case where the additional
government expenditure falls on domestic goods. Sachs and Wyplosz
(1984) examine other cases.
3
See footnote 1 for these references.
4
Using a price-index would complicate the dynamics without altering
any of the results.
In an earlier version of the paper, the expected inflation term
was set equal the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic
currency. This made the dynamics messier but we still had the four
cases in Sections 4 and 5.
One cannot be as sanguine as Henderson and Rogoff (1982) and
Branson and Henderson (1985), who maintain that under rational expec-
tations the long-run equilibrium is always a saddle-point. This is
true for the flexible price case as we saw in Section 4, but may not
hold for a sticky price model. It is shown in some notes available
from the author that in this case negative net foreign asset position
could be an independent source of instability.
-20-
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APPENDIX
In equation (16) the coefficients of A matrix, i.e., 6..'s, are
given by
6 n = (-f-Kx 2 (B 1 -6 2f))/a 1 6 12 = ^ 2 (8 1+8 2 )/a 1 5 13 = -(f+a^f Vc^
6
21
= 1T ( 6rB 2 f) 5 22
=
^^i+B 2 ) 6 23 = " " B 2 f
6
31
= 5
33
=
-Y f 6 32
= -Y
The values of x and y in equation (17) are
x = (-(0L,6,CL~ l -\ )(yf+X )-X (f+a.6 f)/a.)/S211 u uu 22 1
y = -rrf(B,a ~
1
+B X )/S >11 2 u
where S = -rr(Yf+X (8,-6 f)) < and X is the positive root,
u 1 2 u
To determine the sign of x, first we note that it is negative if
X > aj.a, . Substituting a„B,a. ' in place of X in the character-u211 211 u
istic equation of A (from equation 16), we get the following expres-
sion :
-
1r8
1
((a
1
/a
1
)
2
B
1
(B
1
+B
2
)+(Yf/ci
1
)(a
2
B
1
-l)]
- (a
2
B
1
a
1
~ 1
)fTT(B
1
+e
2
)fa
1
" 1
-ha
2
B
L
a
1
" 1 (l+a
2
B
2
)fa
1
" 1
]
A sufficient condition for this to be negative (and thus x to be nega-
tive) is a 8 . > 1, as discussed in the text.
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